Introduction
Three trains were in collision just south of Clapham Junction immediately after 08.00 h on the morning of 12 December 1988. Two were packed commuter trains carrying over 1800 passengers, the majority travelling from Hampshire and Dorset to work in London. The third was an empty outward bound train from Waterloo. Thirty-five people were killed (33 dead on site, one dead on arrival at St George's Hospital and one died later of severe injuries) and 118 were injured and taken to the hospital Accident & Emergency Department of whom 38 were admitted (10 to the ICU).
St George's Hospital, Tooting was designated as the receiving hospital and its major incident plan initiated. The hospital is sited four miles from the accident and the relevant medical and paramedical staff were dispatched to the accident site. Rescue operations were prompt and access good, if cramped. A steep bank up from the cutting posed some difficulties in evacuation. Transfer to the hospital was rapid with the 41 admissions and the 80 patients assessed and discharged directly from A & E all registered by 10.00 h with the peak admissions between 09.30 h and 09.50 h. The A & E Department was only closed to local services for 2 hours.
Psychiatry was not included in the hospital's major incident plan so no response was mobilized directly. The first author (TB) holds the appointment of liaison psychiatrist, but was on leave and contacted at 16.30 h. The psychiatric response was initiated, in collaboration with the hospital chaplaincy (already extensively engaged in counselling and support work) that evening. The second author (SH) became involved the next morning when the two authors took responsibility for directing and coordinating the psychiatric response. This paper will describe the components of that response and critically appraise a number of its aspects. It will outline the psychiatric response which has since been incorporated into the major accident plan.
Because of the nature of this particular disaster (those involved living in stable communities with good local services distant from the accident) our service did not become extensively involved in counselling PTSD sufferers or bereaved relatives. These needs are being met locally and this paper will confine itself to the hospital response in the first 2 weeks.
The immediate response In the early evening (9 hours after the accident) A & E were still processing the consequences ofthe incident with many passengers and survivors still unaccounted for. The final death toll was uncertain. Having met with the A & E consultant and senior chaplain, it was agreed that there should be a meeting the next morning to coordinate the psychiatric response. Discussions took place with the police at this stage about arrangements for support of relatives who would be coming to identify the dead. The chaplaincy undertook to negotiate directly with social services to make suitable arrangements.
The senior chaplain and liaison psychiatrist (TB) undertook a joint round of the receiving and back-up wards. Although involvement of the medical social workers with the wards was already established, it was decided to offer daily proactive contact from psychiatry. The round enabled an accurate assessment of the extent of the problems. Of the 38 patients admitted, 10 were in the intensive care unit (ICU) and very seriously ill. Over half of the remainder, although seriously shaken up with bruising and some fractures, were physically comfortable. They anticipated early discharge with no scarring or long-term problems. The remainder had more serious injuries which they knew would require more prolonged treatment but were not in any serious danger. Only one inpatient on the ICU was outwardly very distraught at this stage, as were her family. On the whole, people appeared calm and relieved.
The round also established the availability of psychiatric and pastoral care in the minds of ward staff and was welcomed by them. Our concerns that the visit might be seen as intrusive or disruptive for busy ward staff were clearly unfounded. Contact telephone numbers and names were left with staff and they were asked to make sure that patients were not discharged without a psychiatric assessment.
Later that evening telephone calls were made to colleagues who had had experience of previous disasters (King's Cross, Piper Alpha) and advice sought. All three contacted gave essentially the same advice:
Collect a team (establish control) Keep it small Centralize information (clerical help). On the morning of the second day a steering group was formed (see Figure 1 ). This consisted of the two authors, senior chaplain, A & E consultant and Department of Psychiatry biostatistician (both of whom had been collaborating on a study of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in A & E attenders). The meeting was concerned with identifying priorities and allocating tasks. A decision was made to keep the steering group membership to those already present at that meeting. Offers of help were flooding in, as were differing suggestions for the composition of and tasks for, the steering group. It was felt that attempts
Core Group Psychiatric senior registrars + consultants (TB & SH)
Medical social workers I Inpatients to assess and compare these alternative suggestions were simply not practicable, given the need for urgent action. The existing steering group had the advantage of all knowing each other and already being involved. We agreed to a daily meeting until it was decided to 'stand down'.
The Unit General Manager had already agreed secretarial resources and the biostatistician organized for a part-time secretary in the Department to work full-time for up to 3 months. He undertook to organize the database on a computer which was provided promptly by British Rail. In the course of the disaster response over 400 individuals were registered on this database including:
38 inpatients 80 survivors assessed in A & E 200 hospital staff involved 40 ambulance staff involved 7 telephone requests for counselling 29 volunteer counsellors 3 police and fire brigade contacts.
One psychiatrist (TB) organized for the local social services, who had set up a 24-h helpline, to liaise with the psychiatric emergency clinic nurse who would act as a coordinator for both requests for, and offers of help with, counselling. For volunteer counsellors we required a commitment of at least one hour per week for a minimum of six weeks. The senior chaplain and the A & E consultant accepted responsibility for dealing with any staff issues and proposed that psychological debriefing be offered to all involved hospital staff. It was agreed that this should be organized in groups and arranged for the 5th day after the incident. The A & E consultant ensured communication with the outpatient group and their GPs. The two psychiatrists undertook to organize a 'core group' of psychiatrists to provide cover and treatment for the inpatients. At this first meeting it was decided (in order to avoid intrusion) that psychiatric assessment would follow a specific request, either from ward staff or the medical social worker allocated to the patient. It was decided that the 'core group' should be pitched at senior registrar level and that a minimum commitment to daily involvement was required.
On the 3rd day we found that a couple of patients had already been discharged or transferred to local hospitals without psychiatric assessment. The core group, therefore, made direct contact with their allocated inpatients and a duty rota was established with a hospital switchboard bleep. The pros and cons of using questionnaires to help structure the psychiatric interview were discussed in depth. Some team members had used the questionnaires, already part of an A & E study of trauma survivors and found them helpful. It was eventually decided that they should be used with all patients. The questionnaires were the Horowitz Impact of Event Schedule', the Beck Depression Inventory2 and the Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Scales3.
The steering group stood down on the 5th day, although regular meetings continued between its members and core group members over the ensuing weeks.
Survivors
All patients discharged directly from A & E took a handwritten letter with them to their GPs. It rapidly became clear from contact with the inpatients that written material, outlining the possible emotional consequences of a major disaster, was much appreciated. Most patients still felt 'numb' and recognized that an emotional reaction was likely later. They were aware that their concentration was poor and that verbal advice might be easily forgotten. A leaflet 'Coping with a Major Personal Crisis . . .', evolved after the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster was rapidly adapted for our circumstances and printed. This leaflet outlined the main features of PTSD with advice on what to expect and when and who to contact if help was needed. A & E arranged for all discharged patients and their GPs to receive these leaflets with an explanatory letter.
Twenty-seven of the 38 inpatients (of whom two died) were assessed by a psychiatrist. As well as a routine psychiatric assessment, patients were asked to fill in the questionnaires which often prompted further discussion of their experiences. A small number ofpatients needed regular contact for individual counselling and some intensive family work was provided by the chaplain for one patient. For most patients exploration and reassurance seemed appropriate and adequate. The opportunity to discuss what could be expected after such an incident was particularly valued. Very few patients needed ongoing counselling from the hospital team after discharge. They were encouraged to contact local services for further help if need be. There were no cases of major psychiatric disorder precipitated in the inpatient group during their brief stay. We informed patients that we would keep some minimal contact with them over the ensuing year to monitor their progress.
Helpline and counselling Wandsworth Social Services manned a helpline 24-h a day for the first week. It soon became clear that, despite adequate publicity in local papers, the helpline was not used and it was closed down. A total of eight referrals were passed on from it to the psychiatric service for counselling. Three of these were personnel involved in the rescue (two ambulance staff and one council workman). Ofthe others, two used the helpline (effectively, it transpired) for personal crises unrelated to the accident. The helpline was often used by third partiesfamily, employers etc. to ask advice about helping survivors.
The service was flooded with offers of help from counsellors in the first days. A list of 29 voluntary counsellors was eventually compiled, but in the end only five individuals were taken on for counselling by them. Most of these individuals complained of features of PTSD4 (such as tension, intrusive thoughts about the accident, poor sleep, concentration etc). It is clear that most of the survivors of this disaster who received counselling did so elsewhere.
Staff debriefing
Over 200 hospital staff were involved in the disaster response. Of these, 120 took part in nine debriefing groups which were held on Friday 16 December, 5 days after the accident. It was decided that psychological debriefing should be offered to all staff involved. We emphasized that this was an integral part of the whole disaster proceedings and not to be confused with counselling. Procedures for staff counselling are well established to ensure confidentiality and are organized through the Staff/ Student Health Department.
The debriefing groups were scheduled for one hour intervals throughout the day and they were thoroughly mixed both in terms of professional background and seniority. They varied in size from eight to 16 members. Psychiatric staff with group therapy experience were recruited to lead them. Only very minimal preparation of the group conductors was possible. Lacking any past experience of leading such groups, we saw our task as encouraging open and frank discussion of the experience of the disaster and, in particular, emotional responses. The leaders saw it as their task to ensure that vulnerable individuals did not over-expose themselves and that the groups ended with some sense of positive closure.
The groups proved to be moving and vivid experiences for all involved. They often had distinct and varying characters according to their composition, but there were a number of regularly occurring themes (Table 1 ). There was general agreement that the disaster experience had been emotionally draining, and qualitatively different from normal work. Many commented that this stress was not related to exposure to particularly tragic sights (most of the fatalities occurred on site and were not brought to the hospital), but more to a sense of being unable to encapsulate and control the task. Although the emotions felt 'overwhelming', nobody reported fear that the service itself would be overwhelmed or fail to cope. It was a relief to share this experience in the group. Dealing with requests for information from distressed relatives was identified as probably the most stressful part of the whole experience, 3 Worry about unsupported juniors 4 Anger at the media (intrusion; patchy cover) 5 Abreaction that evening (alcohol) 6 Response to VIPs 7 Envy/deprivation 8 Guilt over 'buzz': professional pride 9 Difficulty settling back 10 Poor concentration; accident proneness particularly as the information requested was rarely available. Clerks and receptionists, not normally seen as having high-stress roles, were exposed to intense pressure without obvious available support.
Many experienced staff were concerned that they may have inadequately supported their juniors and trainees. There was anger about the mediaboth at their intrusiveness (complained of by patients) and also of their failure to acknowledge the contribution of staff other than doctors and nurses. A number of staff talked of how they found much of their pent-up emotions spilling out when they were off-duty at home, having taken a drink to wind down.
There was also a great need to talk about the experience of suddenly being in the limelight. VIP visits had infuriated some, but made others feel appreciated. Staff removed from the ward to deal with the sudden demand in A & E, felt guilty on returning to their colleagues who had had to stay behind to cover for them, and thereby miss the 'glamorous' experience. There was also some guilt over the exhilaration and professional satisfaction felt by manyoften referred to as a 'buzz'. Many found it difficult settling back into routine ward work after the incident. Interestingly, a number of staff spontaneously reported poor concentration and accident-proneness in the ensuing days.
We asked staff to indicate anonymously if they felt the groups helped and overwhelmingly they did with 14 staff requesting a follow-up group. Only two indicated a wish for one-to-one counselling. The group leaders considered in review that the groups were too short, and would have benefited by being more homogeneous in their membership and structured in their approach. For debriefing groups subsequently run for the London Ambulance Service, the duration was extended to 90 minutes and the approach outlined by Raphael5 was adopted. This work will be reported elsewhere.
Major Incident Plan
The involvement of the psychiatric team in the response to the Clapham train crash has led to the recognition that it has a major role to play in disaster planning and the delivery of care in the event of a future disaster. The psychiatric response is now incorporated in the hospital's major incident plan with six of a total of 52 action cards devoted to it.
In the event of a major incident the general hospital switchboard will notify the psychiatric hospital switchboard to initiate the psychiatric disaster team. The duty or liaison consultant psychiatrist and both on-call psychiatric senior registrars will then be contacted via the psychiatric hospital switchboard. One senior registrar (SR) will proceed to Accident & Emergency and the other to psychiatric outpatients where the Emergency Clinic (EC) nurse will set up the specially designated direct line. The consultant will take direct charge of both SRs. Both SRs, consultant and EC nurse will be automatically relieved of their normal duties and meet daily from the initiation of the disaster response until the team stands down.
The SR and EC nurse will be responsible for manning a helpline, organizing volunteer counsellors and outpatient counselling. They will also function as a psychiatric control point after day 1. The control point for day 1 will be in A & E manned by the consultant and SR, who will deal directly with A & E and the wards. This SR will be responsible for ensuring that the explanatory leaflets 'Coping with a Major Disaster' are made available.
In addition to the six action cards designating the team's immediate response, copies of a fuller document outlining the mechanisms of running a steering group, core team, selecting and organizing volunteer counsellors, setting up a database and organizing staff debriefing are kept at the psychiatric hospital switchboard and the emergency clinic, as are copies of the information leaflet and the questionnaires used after the Clapham disaster.
Conclusion
Our involvement in the Clapham train crash response has indicated clearly the need for, and appreciation of, a substantial organized psychiatric input. No disaster is typical and the nature of the response to any future one cannot be precisely predicted. Certain major aspects of other reported disasters (such as longterm counselling of survivors, support for bereaved relatives, etc) were not issues for us. Indeed some aspects of this disaster, which required our intervention (eg the response to the school overlooking the accident site and to the London Ambulance Service) are very specific and will be reported elsewhere. We did, however, feel able to draw some conclusions about effective disaster response from this experience.
Keeping the team small and manageable was crucial. Directly after a major disaster, despite the objective efficiency of the response, there was a pervasive sense of imminent chaos. Maintaining the team's clear boundaries is a vital defence against disorganization and exhaustion. Our steering group of five worked well together, but we all knew each other previously. How important this latter factor was is impossible to judge, but if the team were not very familiar with each other, then the group might benefit by being even smaller.
We would strongly endorse the advice we received to set up a database and organize secretarial resource. We would also recommend that those responsible for supervising it (the EC nurse and biostatistician in our plan) also take responsibility for communications. Much time was occupied in the first 2 days receiving offers of help and keeping colleagues informed. Such activities are best dealt with by a team member who is not responsible for front-line clinical activity. This member can communicate directly with the team if the message is sufficiently urgent, otherwise offers can be reviewed at the steering group meeting each morning.
Whilst a formal team structure proved most useful in simplifying boundary issues it is also necessary for internal matters. Decisions often had to be made quickly with imperfect knowledge and no one having obviously relevant prior experience. Psychiatric teams have long evolved practices based on working towards consensus. Where consensus did not immediately arise (eg whether to use questionnaires or not in assessments) it is necessary to have a simple hierarchy to identify quickly who can make the decision. We also felt it was important that the team leader (or two leaders in our case) safeguard the primacy of their supervisory role. They must avoid the temptation to take on too much clinical work too early. The action guidelines laid down for the team are very general and the leader must continuously ensure that resource is flexibly redistributed from areas of overprovision to areas of need.
The team needs to be visible and proactive. Being on the spot both ensures that colleagues know who to call on and also allows you to assess needs directly and act on your own judgement. It also has the immeasurable benefit of raising the team's face validity with your colleagues so that important, potentially threatening activities such as psychological debriefing are more readily accepted. Staff debriefing needs to be clearly understood as an integral part of the incident procedure for all staff and distinguished clearly from counselling or psychotherapy. There is time for staff to make some preparation for these groups, and we have found Raphael's book When Disaster Strikes helpful in this area5. Attending to the team's own needs can easily be forgotten. The work is exciting, but exhausting. It can be difficult to switch off. The difficulty of assessing your performance can make it a very stressful time. The team needs to monitor its members to ensure that they are taking adequate time off and not losing a sense of perspective. We have some simple rules, such as insisting on taking a lunch break, reading the paper daily and going home at a reasonable hour. These, allied with attending the daily steering/core group meeting, should ensure that staff are protected. There may also be a role for establishing a support group to explore and discharge tensions within the team.
Staff also need training. It is essential that all staff who may become involved in the major incident procedure familiarize themselves with the plan and the relevant locales. We have decided that the psychiatric response should be reviewed and rehearsed each year.
Introduction
There are now numerous descriptions of human behaviour before, during, and after disasters, and in particular of the problems subsequently reported by disaster survivors'-4. Summaries of these reported problems have been collected in an attempt to delineate diagnostic categories, of which the most used are DSM-IIIR and ICD-10. The question which must be answered is whether it is possible to go beyond a detailed description of post-disaster reactions, and to provide an explanatory framework and the beginnings of a model of human reactions to adversity.
From a research point of view, disasters can be considered as natural experiments, in which unselected groups of people are subjected to events which are outside the range of ordinary human experience. As such they have implications for the understanding of the causes and development of stress related disorders. They may help us to understand more about the nature of anxiety and depression, and why it is that so many people are able to cope with adversity without major psychological ill affects. However, these objectives can only be achieved if observations are linked to explanations, and these explanations are then tested against new data.
The explanations which tend to be given about stress reactions are often simple and non-theoretical. Arguments are drawn by analogy from the engineering of solid structures, where stress is the force per unit area exerted between contiguous bodies in parts of a body. This is commonly depicted as a large weight resting on a fragile and unstable structure. As a term, stress is often used in situations in which strain would be more appropriate. 'Strain' describes the case where objects are stretched tightly and made taut and exercised to their greatest possible extent.
Compressive stress is what a large weight applies to anything beneath it. Strain is the extent to which the supporting structure is deformed and compressed by the weight above. By plotting stress against strain it is possible to derive what is called the 'elastic modulus' for any material, and this measure allows architects and engineers to choose appropriate materials to bear particular loads. Common to all these views of psychological stress is the notion that when a soft human body comes into contact with hard objects, damage is likely to result. By analogy, events are seen as hard objects which weight a person down, and which require an elastic and stable structure to withstand.
The term 'stress' is used so loosely that distinctions are often not drawn between cause and effect. This has led to considerable confusion both in public perceptions and in the stress literature. Properly speaking, stress is not an object in the world. It is the reaction of an organism to events in the world. In order to make this distinction clear it is usual to distinguish between stressors, which are objects and 0141-0768/91/ 010019-04/$02.00/0 © 1991 The Royal Society of Medicine
